The Trade Balancing, China Approach, US Alliance Expansion, Dollar Preservation As Reserve Currency, Global Poverty Reduction Bill

Both Henry Kissinger and George Kennan, geopolitical giants, aimed to manage the Soviet Union, but with different approaches:

  • Kennan: Advocated “containment”—resisting Soviet expansion through strong alliances and counterforce at strategic points. He emphasized long-term pressure and internal changes within the Soviet system. This approach is more necessary for addressing the challenge posed by China.
  • Kissinger: Focused on “balance of power” and détente. He sought to manage the Soviet Union through diplomacy, strategic arms limitations, and engaging with China to create a triangular balance. (For reference, he thought of building up China as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union—a strategic blunder. The U.S. should not be in the business of building up superpowers, for example, India. The only point on which Kissinger was correct is the need for a balanced approach; China should not be allowed to become a larger economy than the U.S.)

Containment and Balance

The U.S. cannot stop China from being a superpower at this point. The goal now is to prevent China from becoming the largest economy. Containment involves trading more with the countries that China is targeting for alliances and partnerships. Balance involves leveling the economic playing field between China and the U.S., so China gains no economic advantage from the trade relationship. This means the U.S. should eliminate its trade deficit with China and persuade Europe to do the same. The U.S. will need to run trade deficits with alleys to beat China.

The undeniable truth is that economic power translates to global influence. China is projected to have an economy 50% larger than the U.S. by 2060, making it the next dominant superpower. The average U.S. GDP growth rate is 2.5%, while China’s is 5%. China’s economy is a $20 trillion GDP, while the U.S. economy is a $30 trillion GDP. The U.S. must focus on reducing China’s growth to between 1% and 2.5% over the next two years. Based on current averages, China will reach economic parity with the U.S. by 2045, with both countries having a GDP of $45 trillion. However, this will most likely happen sooner rather than later. Over the next five years, China’s percentage of global manufacturing will increase significantly. In 2023, it was 28%; today, it is nearly 32% today, and by 2030, it is projected to be 45%. This represents a huge imbalance that can only be addressed via tariffs.

We stand at a precipice. Failure to act decisively will cede global dominance to China. Implementing the strategies outlined here is not merely advantageous — it’s essential. By doing so, China’s 2045 GDP will be held to $30 trillion, its manufacturing growth will stagnate, and its trade surplus will be halved, while the U.S. GDP will reach $45 trillion, preserving a crucial lead. The U.S. currently possesses significant influence over China’s growth trajectory, a fact China recognizes. However, by 2045, without the implementation of this plan, that influence will vanish. Imagine a Chinese aircraft carrier operating unchallenged off the coast of Virginia, within the U.S. exclusive economic zone. Picture the U.S. Navy issuing warnings of sovereign territory violations, only to be met with complete and utter disregard from China. This is the stark reality we face if we fail to act. The roles will be reversed; the U.S. will find itself in a position akin to China’s today.

While China’s domestic services, consumption, real estate, and construction sectors struggle, its growth engines are green energy, technology development, and export manufacturing. These sectors are heavily subsidized by the government—subsidies made possible only by China’s massive global trade surplus, largely generated by trade with the United States. Thus, China’s primary growth driver at the moment is manufacturing and exports for the United States. 

This growth is currently fueled, in part, by a select few countries and regions. Primarily, the U.S. contributes to 50% of China’s growth, Europe 25%, and a handful of other U.S. allies and friendly nations, such as India, Thailand, the Philippines, Turkey, Colombia, Vietnam, and Mexico, contribute the remaining portion. If all of these countries declared they would raise tariffs on China until trade was balanced, China would run a trade deficit and experience no economic growth at all for 20 years.

In 2024, the U.S. world trade deficit was $1.221 billion. China’s 2024 trade surplus was $992 billion. This surplus, along with accompanying manufacturing activity, was a major contributor to China’s 5% GDP growth in 2024. (A $992 billion surplus divided by a $20 trillion GDP is approximately 5%GDP growth). The TV pundits claim China is in decline. The reality is they are just getting started. China’s annual trade surplus is directly linked to its GDP growth.

A breakdown of China’s 2024 trade surplus with the U.S. reveals the extent of the problem:

  • ~$50 billion in de minimis direct package shipments.
  • $295 billion direct trade surplus.
  • +$40 billion in Mexican final assemblies (primarily at 1,300 Chinese-owned factories in Mexico, with 40% of all products coming from Mexico containing Chinese components).
  • +$30 billion in Vietnamese final assemblies coming from China.
  • +$10 billion in foreign (non-Chinese) automotive vehicles with Chinese components.
  • +$50 billion in Chinese components and supply chains in other countries.

This totals show a $500 billion trade deficit with China. This clarifies why Xi Jinping consistently urges against “weaponizing trade.” If China’s surplus drops drastically, it can no longer project power in its current manner, China cannot subsidize in Artificial Intelligence and semiconductors at the same pace. It will no longer need to import so much iron ore from Brazil helping to naturally undermine the alliance China has with Brazil, and it will need to backtrack on building alliances and focus on maintaining its domestic growth initiatives.

Trading more with other countries should result in the U.S. selling more to those countries. China is a country that does not reciprocate fairly. Consider these 2023 figures:

  • The current U.S. global trade ratio is $1 in exports for every $1.35 in imports.
  • Excluding China’s approximately $500 billion deficit (direct and indirect), the ratio becomes $1 in exports for every $1.18 in imports. Without China, the U.S. trade relationship with the rest of the world is relatively balanced, with only an 18% imbalance (approximately $500 billion deficit vs. $1 trillion deficit).
  • China is the U.S.’s largest trading partner, with a highly imbalanced ratio of $1 in exports for every $3 in imports. With indirect and de minimis shipments, it is a $1 to $5 ratio.

President Trump doesn’t need to tariff anyone, as only one country is destabilizing fair trade.  The opportunity lies in shifting imports away from China and lobbing that $500 billion onto 35 pre-identified countries and regions that make the most sense geopolitically, and toward nations that reciprocate trade. Even if trade with these other nations remains imbalanced, it is far more balanced than trade with China, at a 1 to 1.18 ratio vs 1 to 5 ratio. This could significantly boost U.S. exports and create jobs. Redirecting the $500 billion of the $650 billion (2024) spent on Chinese imports could generate an estimated $169 billion to $278 billion in new U.S. exports, representing substantial economic activity.

THE BILL:

SECTION 1

BALANCING TRADE WITH COMPETITOR COUNTRIES

(b) Accelerated Tariff on Critical Goods and Redundant Products:

A tariff shall be imposed on all products originating in China that fall within the following categories:

  1. Critical national importance,
  2. National security,
  3. Pharmeceuticals/ chemicals that make pharmeceuticals
  4. Future technologies not yet made,
  5. Designated medical products,
  6. Clothing, Textiles, Shoes and Apparel,
  7. Appliances, Furniture, other light manufacturing,
  8. Consumer Appliances and Electronics
  9. Microchips or products in them with semiconductors less than 24 nm,
  10. Commodity-related products (steel, aluminum, copper, iron ore, chemicals, etc.),
  11. Products currently manufactured in the United States or allied countries,

Any product readily transferable for production in the United States or third-party countries, This tariff shall commence at 20%  and increase by 1% monthly, indefinitely, forever (12% annually). 

(c) High-Tech Exemption:  An exemption from the tariffs outlined in sections (a), and (b) may be granted for high-technology products for a period not to exceed three years. This exemption is contingent upon demonstrable efforts to relocate the production of said high-technology products outside of China. 

(d) Other Tariffs: This law and the tariffs in this law are not subject to removal by executive order, and other tariffs placed in addition to these tariffs would be additional to these tariffs and would have no effect on altering the increases.  

(d) Tariff on Chinese Content in Imports:  A tariff shall be imposed on all products imported into the United States from any country, if such products contain any content originating in China. This includes, but is not limited to, sub-assemblies, components, steel, copper aluminum supply chain elements, and software. This tariff shall commence at 4% and increase by 1% quarterly. The tariff increase shall continue in perpetuity.  

(e) Tariff on di Minimus Imports:  A tariff of 100% will be placed on direct ship mail products from Asia, as well as the cost to process each package. The tariff will start at 20% and increase 20% per quarter until reaching 140%. 

Everything else in this bill could be forgotten, as long as Section 1 is implemented.

SECTION 2

BALANCE TRADE WITH ALLIES, FRIENDS AND PARTNERS

(a) Effective Date: The provisions of section 2 shall take effect on January 1, 2028.

(b) Tariff on Imports from High-Income Countries: A 4% tariff shall be automatically imposed on all imports from countries with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita exceeding $20,000 if the ratio of United States imports from said country to United States exports to said country exceeds 1.4:1. If this trade ratio falls below 1.4:1, this tariff shall be removed. If the trade ratio remains above 1.4:1, the tariff shall increase by 1% per quarter in perpetuity. If the ratio remains above 1.4:1 for three consecutive years, the monthly increase is 1% per month. 

(g) Exempt Countries from Section 2 (b) and 2 (c) : Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Libya,  Switzerland. Due to Oil and Gold imports.

(h) Exempt Goods: The following goods are exempt from tariffs imposed under this section: Commodities, Oil, Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), Minerals (refined and unrefined), Precious metals (gold, palladium, platinum), Rare earth minerals (refined and unrefined).

SECTION 3

COUNTERING CURRENCY MANIPULATION BY ADVERSERY COUNTRIES

(a) Currency Monitoring:   The United States Department of the Treasury shall monitor and quantify any devaluation of the currency of the People’s Republic of China against the United States Dollar (USD).

(b) Tariff Response to Devaluation:  In the event of a devaluation of the Chinese Yuan against the USD, a one-time tariff increase shall be imposed on all goods originating in China. This tariff increase shall have a maximum cap of 9% each year. This tariff increase shall be implemented each quarter to gradually spread out the increase.

(c) Graduated Tariff Response to minor devaluation: If the Chinese Yuan devalues by 1% against the USD in a given year, a 1% tariff increase on all goods originating in China.

(d) Tariff Response to Significant Devaluation with Gradual Countermeasure:  If the Chinese Yuan devalues by 15% or more against the USD in a given year, the following tariff increases on all goods originating in China shall be implemented:

  • Tariff increase of 9% in year 1
  • An additional 6% in year 2

SECTION 4

PREVENTION OF FULL DECOUPLING AND RETALIATION FROM CHINA

(a) Prevention of Decoupling: If China drops imports 10% below the $147.5 billion 2023 level, the United States will impose technology restrictions on more benign technology, such as the COMAC C919 single-aisle aircraft, and other technologies, including international bans.  (b) Full technology restrictions will be placed on China if it attempts a full decoupling.  A panel will be created to determine which technologies to restrict in this case. 

(a) Tariff-Free Access:  US companies that currently import products from China or other countries via contract manufacturers or third-party manufacturers shall be granted tariff-free access to the United States market for goods produced in factories if they set up their own factory that they own and operate in any country outside of China, provided the following conditions are met:

  • Ownership: US citizens must hold at least 70% ownership of the foreign entity operating the factory.  The business must be headquartered in the United States.
  • Exclusion of Chinese Content: The goods must not contain any components, sub-assemblies, raw materials, or intellectual property originating in China.

(b) Vehicles and Transportation:  Vehicles, trucks, and other transportation vehicles shall remain subject to standard tariffs, regardless of the ownership structure of the manufacturing facility.

(c) Exception for Relocated US Factories:  This tariff exemption shall not apply in cases where a US-based factory is closed for the primary purpose of relocating its operations outside of the United States. An independant panel will determine if this is the case.

(d) Specific Products Exemptions:  The tariff exemption for US owned factories will not apply for the products listed in Section 7.

 Section 6: Bilateral Trade Agreements and Priority Countries

The United States shall pursue bilateral trade agreements and prioritize strengthening trade relationships with countries that meet the following criteria. (1) Existing Trade Deficit Countries (2) Countries that suffer from Dollar Scarcity forcing them to rely on the Yuan.  (3) Countries abused by China’s trade Practices and have large deficits (4) Countries China is targeting for strategic partnerships. (5) Countries with Formalized Allied Relationships with the United Stats.

(a) Existing Trade Deficits with the USA:   Priority shall be given to countries that don’t have a history of abusing the United States with trade, including but not limited to:

  1. Argentina;
  2. Brazil;
  3. Chile;
  4. Colombia;
  5. Peru;
  6. Honduras
  7. Dominican Republic;
  8. Egypt;
  9. Guatemala;
  10. Uruguay;
  11. Paraguay;
  12. Panama.

(b) Dollar Scarcity and Yuan Usage: Priority shall be given to countries experiencing dollar scarcity and increasing reliance on the Chinese Yuan, including but not limited to:

  1. Sri Lanka;
  2. Pakistan;
  3. Tunisia;
  4. Argentina;
  5. Egypt;
  6. Nigeria;
  7. Ghana;
  8. Kenya;
  9. Ethiopia;
  10. Zambia;
  11. Bangladesh;
  12. Suriname;
  13. Turkey.

(c) Significant Trade Deficits with China:  Priority shall be given to countries with substantial trade deficits with China that don’t currently have a free trade agreement or are not negotiating free trade agreements with China, with the aim of convincing these countries to raise tariffs on China in order to balance their trade with China one to one (1 to 1).

  1. India;
  2. Mexico;
  3. Turkey;
  4. Nigeria;
  5. Bangladesh;
  6. European Union member states; Spedifically Spain, Netherlands, and other countries that the US has a trade surplus with.
  7. Colombia.  

(d) Targets of Chinese Alliance-Building Countries: Priority shall be given to countries that China is actively seeking to cultivate as allies. The United States shall aim to establish “indispensable” trade relationships with these countries to counter China’s influence. These countries include, but are not limited to:

  1. Brazil;
  2. Chile;
  3. Peru;
  4. Malaysia;
  5. Indonesia;
  6. Argentina;

(e)  Formalized Allied Countries:  Priority will be given to countries that are formal US allies:

  1. Philippians;
  2. Colombia;  
  3. Egypt;
  4. Australia;
  5. Bahrain;
  6. Brazil;
  7. Colombia;
  8. Tunisia;
  9. Israel;
  10. Japan;
  11. Jordan;
  12. Kenya;
  13. Kuwait;
  14. Morocco;
  15. New Zealand;
  16. Pakistan;
  17. Thailand;
  18. South Korea;

Implementation: The United States Trade Representative (USTR), in consultation with relevant government agencies, shall be responsible for developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy to pursue bilateral trade agreements and strengthen trade relationships with the countries identified in this section. This strategy shall include, but not be limited to:

  • Identifying specific trade opportunities
  • Prioritizing Ex/Im Bank to move production from China to these countries.
  • Providing technical assistance to facilitate trade
  • Support for these countries to set up free trade manufacturing zones that work.
  • Support to these countries to help make reforms to bring stability.
  • Monitoring compliance with trade agreements
  • Most importantly Negotiate initially bilateral trade agreements
  • Lastly Negotiate multi-lateral trade agreements.

(b) Exempt Countries: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.

(c) Quata For Major Non-NATO Alley (MNNA) Countries at the time of this law’s passage with a GDP per capita of less than $4,000, tariffs will only take effect if imports exceed 2024 import levels for the specified items. Quota’d countries: Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines and Tunisia.

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